Hello, Andrew, how are you?

 

Good, thank you.

 

With two of your hats on - first as your Construction Dispute and Building Safety hat on for Forsters, but also in terms of your role on the NLA technical expert panel for the New London Agenda, I wondered if you could give me your initial reaction to the publication of the Grenfell final report?

 

Yes. When you're looking at this report and the recommendations that have come out, they are wide-ranging and touch a large number of parts of the industry, which we can come on to, and which is a good thing.  I think the important context to have, though, is that the problems that it's trying to address were problems that started in the early '90s, and any solution to a problem that's been so well ingrained into the industry is going to seem dramatic and will feel like a sledgehammer to crack the nut. But in this case, it's very necessary to take this dramatic action. So, I think that it's a good thing, the kind of robust measures that have been recommended, but it is going to create a large amount of uncertainty within an industry that's already feeling the effects of the first phase report, which also created a lot of change and a lot of uncertainty. So even those that are well versed in construction matters and understand fire safety are finding it difficult to get to grips with it, and those that are just interested in real estate investment, a couple of steps removed, will find it even more difficult to understand how to make sense of all these changes. So, I say that really because it might appear I'm quite critical of some of the things that have come out in the recommendations because of the effect that they are likely to have. But I do think that the inquiry should be applauded in the way that it's gone about it, and I think it was inevitable that it was going to cause this kind of uncertainty and disruption within the industry. It needed that, probably. So that's a bit of a waffly preamble, but I think it's important to have that general overview.

 

Yes, thank you.

 

For me, there are various ways into it, I suppose. What's clear is that, if you pick some of the areas, now that are of uncertainty, we're now going to have a Construction Regulator, assuming that a large number of these recommendations are going to be implemented. But I think we can work on the basis that a large number of them will be. A lot of them from the Phase One report recommendations were implemented. And in these recommendations, there is a specific one that says, in the past, select committees have been ignored, and that caused some of the problems. So that was a very strong marker that there's a strong recommendation to take these on. So, let's assume we're going to have these things, and there's going to be a Construction Regulator, which is not clear how that's going to sit with the Building Safety regulator, which has only just been set up, and the market is only just really coming to grips with in practical terms. And that has a huge effect on how buildings are built, with the various gateway regimes in place and signed off, and there are already uncertainties as to when buildings will be completed and if It's going to be possible to complete them on time because of having to go through this thing. So, we're introducing another Construction Regulator, which is supposed to consolidate the whole regulation process. But if it sits alongside this as well, it's not clear how it's going to work exactly. So, there's one there. Another one is that the guidance that is currently in place is called Approved Document B. That guidance that's in place, which is supposed to help practitioners interpret the legislation and comply with the legislation, came in for heavy criticism in the report, and there's a recommendation that it be reviewed wholesale. And it's likely to be changed. Now, until that happens, the industry is on notice that that it is now no longer good guidance, as it were, or it needs to be handled very carefully. And so, I think it will cause some confusion and uncertainty as to how buildings are assessed and whether they're in current construction, whether they're being reviewed after completion, as to whether or not legislation has been complied with. Fire strategies are now going to be reviewed again. You can see precisely why that's been happening. It has happened to cater for vulnerable occupants of buildings, but building owners have had to grapple with a new fire strategy regime just recently to make sure that external walls and balconies and flat doors have been incorporated into the risk assessments and the fire strategies. That will potentially have to be all reviewed again. And until those are done, it's difficult to know quite how you're going to value buildings, assess buildings for safety and what have you. They've introduced a change in the definition of higher-risk building, which is a huge change. And now they've said, from there being lots of debate about whether it's 18 meters, 11 meters, what have you, now the report has said that height is not the critical factor. It's actually the nature of the building, the way it's used, and in particular, whether the building has vulnerable occupants in it. And that could bring them into scope of this higher risk regime, a larger number of buildings...

 

And is a ‘vulnerable occupant’ also redefined or defined?

 

Well, that's a very good point, because, no, I don't think it is. I haven't seen it defined. And of course, the building occupancy may change during its lifetime, and then what happens? Does a higher-risk building suddenly no longer become a higher-risk building? That's not going to be particularly clear. And if you think about you know the potential confusion, you know, even something as potentially binary as the height of the building has been a source of huge dispute. I mean, you give lawyers anything and they'll turn a dispute into it. And there have been different methods of measuring the height of the building...

 

Really? Like what?

 

Well, if the building is on a slope...

 

Oh, okay...

 

...Which point do you take as the bottom? If there's plant on the top of the building, do you go right to the top of the plant? And there have been, you know, meters within it, but it had made a big difference if you're just under or just over the 18-metre mark. So, there was some specific guidance that had to be issued to explain to people how to measure a building. And if you think about that - something as simple, really, or thought as simple as measuring a building, you know, if you're going to try and decide whether someone's a vulnerable occupant or not, even though there probably will be a definition when it comes to it, there will be some disagreement about that. And what if the building is partially occupied with vulnerable people and partially not? And maybe it's proportionate. There's potential there, and it has wide-ranging effects...

 

All of which means a lot more work now will be forthcoming from this report in terms of future organizations and future definitions and regulatory changes, then, presumably. When is all this going to be enacted fully, and indeed, are you optimistic that changes will be made across the board that will mean that our cities can be safer places in terms of combustible cladding - or any cladding?

 

Well, I think there will be a strong reaction to it, in the direction of change. The government has come out to say that this is a government which appears to be keener on regulatory reform or regulation of the industry. I think that has been one of the criticisms - that previous administrations deregulated the fire safety regime in an attempt to promote business growth and development.

 

This is David Cameron's red tape... 

 

Yes, exactly. You can expect this government to take a different approach, particularly in line with this report. So, I think we will see changes. How quickly it will happen is again, something this government is committing to doing. I mean, it's made a commitment to remediate buildings quicker, which we can come on to in a second. But in terms of turning these recommendations into law, well, with the phase one inquiry, I think the recommendation came out in October 2019. The Building Safety Act, which was a major part, came out, and had Royal Assent in April 2022. So that gives you an idea of the time scale. It may be that we can do things a little bit quicker, but I think it isn't possible to do things as quickly as you know, the lay person, or a person has who been affected by these people would want, I think, because it's right that any of these changes are done with consultation in the industry. There are various different competing and interested parties - consultants, contractors, financiers, building owners, investors. They all have a vested interest in these new arrangements, and I would expect them to be consulted before draft legislation is put before Parliament and then enacted. So, you know, we are a few years away, a couple of years away you'd expect before any of this comes into law. And that in itself, is a difficulty, because in the interim, there will be lots of publication about where the consultations are leading, people speculating about what will happen, and the market reacts to that speculation. So that will be difficult for all concerned, I think.

 

Yes. I read that this whole process has cost the taxpayer about £200 million so far. And you know, the inquiry took evidence over 400 days, spanning seven years. The inquiry itself, you presumably regard as very thorough and fit for purpose and has come up with the right kind of noises and proposals. The other phrase that comes to mind on this whole thing is what's called the 'merry-go-round of buck-passing', which implies a sort of systemic problem within the built environment professions. How deep in the mire are we on that one, do you think?

 

Well, that has definitely come out loud and clear from the inquiry - that there were multiple reasons for the failure at Grenfell Tower and within the industry. I think that that is an important and good thing for us to recognize. Up to this point, I personally feel that the blame has been laid at developers' doors. Whilst they have had a part to play in it, no question, because they were procuring, and, you know, were responsible for how the building is designed and built, they are perfectly entitled to rely on the advice and expertise of the people they appoint - the contractors and designers, the manufacturers. And they have been shown to be clearly incompetent in many cases, sometimes for good reasons. You know, we heard that, you know, the Studio E architect is just very junior, and it was his first job. People have been put into positions where they just weren't capable, and not necessarily the fault of the individual. But this merry-go-round that's been highlighted, I think that was the lead counsel Richard Millett's phrase at the start and end of the inquiry and it's absolutely the case that all of the parties expressed a huge amount of regret, but nobody took responsibility. I'd read somewhere that the local authority was the closest that came to saying, 'Well, we really should have done better'. And that's been shown in the report, because we now have a further regulation of fire engineers; there's going to be a tighter regulation of their qualifications. Same for architects: if they want to work on higher-risk buildings, main contractors will need to be licensed. And they've gone so far as to say that a director of a main contractor will need to give a personal undertaking that the building has been built in compliance with building regulations. Now that is an unbelievably draconian measure. I haven't read the entirety of what's behind that recommendation, but there's clearly a finding from the report that main contractors have failed to take responsibility when they should have done, so putting it on an individual they feel is the way to go. So, all of that regulation is going to have all sorts of impacts, to my mind. I think that in the short term, it may well mean that those that already have those qualifications and competence and ability will be fine, but there are others, which the market might now disregard until they've got those qualifications, or it may be more difficult or more expensive for those people to get PI insurance, and it may be that they are just reviewed as a lower standard of contractor or consultant. And that will place even greater strain on a resource-starved industry. One of the big problems, and why I think it's going to be difficult for remediation works to be done any faster than it's being done at the moment is because there is just a shortage of people who are competent enough to advise and do the work that's necessary. And I think that one of the unfortunate effects of these recommendations is that it might actually reduce the pool of people, either because they are not being chosen by the market to do the work, or because they extract themselves from the market. you might find main contractors deciding that doing work on higher-risk buildings is too risky now, and they don't want to do it anymore, and so there's fewer contractors that are able. And so that will reduce competition, and it might mean that prices go up. That's an example of a sort of an unwanted potential effect. But I can see why the recommendation has been made.

 

Well, that's a fantastic summary. Thank you for your views, Andrew: is there anything else you take from this? I mean, on a personal note, are you personally more optimistic that we can avoid tragedies like Grenfell after this process than you were before?

 

I think so, certainly in the short term. I really hope that we've learned the lessons from Grenfell and that the industry has, and that the correct amount of rigour is given to these buildings which are identified as being higher risk. Whether you want to be cynical or not - when time goes by and the market forces start to come into play again, whether the standards will slip, who knows? But for the moment, I'm optimistic. I think it has been a well-received report. It's been very thoroughly done; the experts that they had at their disposal were the best the world has to offer, including the lawyers that were interrogating the evidence and Sir Martin Moor-Bick, a highly experienced judge. So, there's every reason to think that this is a properly considered and well-thought-out report. So, let's hope that it is. There were a couple of other things I might just mention. When I was thinking of the effects and how wide-ranging they might be, what will be interesting is also whether design and build as a procurement route becomes less common as a result of this. It's, in my experience, by far the most common method of procurement, and I think that's in large part because it's very attractive to third parties that have an interest in this work. So, a bank or financier, an end user; it gives them one point of responsibility for anything that might go wrong with the building. But as I said before, you might find that contractors are less prepared to take on that design responsibility now on a higher-risk building. And you may also find that the market thinks that the best way to procure these buildings is not with a design and build route, which is vulnerable to this value engineering, which came out in the report, which was really an abused process. I think it was Stephanie Barwise who said Value Engineering should be a cheaper way of producing the same quality of product, and I think that value engineering had drifted into reducing the quality of the product, and not making that clear. So, design and build might have a different future; in which case, financiers and people that invest in buildings might have a different approach to the risk that they see coming out of these buildings, and so the cost of finance might go up as a result. This is all speculation, but it just shows how wide-ranging it can be, I suppose.

 

Sure. Well, thank you again, Andrew, that's really fascinating, and I share your optimism, or at least hope for this to be the final report of something so tragic. Thank you again.

 

All right, no problem at all. Thanks!

 

Nice to talk. Thanks. Bye!